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I began  to study water economics when I arrived at Utah
State Univer sity in 1962.  A small water market in central
Utah, where farmers in four irrigation companies
exchanged water at free prices, intrigued me.  The
resulting increases in econom ic efficiency were so
apparent that I wondered why water markets had not
emerged over a much broader geographic area in the
West.   I also discovered tremendous differences in per
capita  use of urban water among comm unities in northern
Utah, and this led me to explore elasticity of demand and
other factors affecting water consumption.  How ever, it
was water institutions that in terested m e most, an d it is
that subject which I wish to explore in this note.
A significant erosion of private property rights in water
has occurred in  the past fifty years.  I believe that the
consequences for efficient water allocation have been far
more serious than is commonly realized, although mo re
empirical work n eeds to be  done to  test this hypothesis.
This  note will  review the institutions that were important
in the development of the western United States (U.S.),
review the emergence of some water marketing, and
discuss the increasing trend to allocate water by purely
political criteria.
WATER INSTITUTIONS OF THE SETTLEMENT
PERIOD
During the settlement o f the Am erican w est, in the m ain
the legal institutions used to develop and allocate water
were prior-app ropriation  law, adm inistered at the state
level, and compacts that divided the water o f interstate
rivers among states.  These institutions provided the
required security of tenure in water for farmers and
miners,  who were the primary  instigators of e conom ic
progres s, to develo p this arid reg ion.  
To obtain a “r ight,” those  who w ished to ap propriate
water ha d to satisfy tw o require ments  impose d by a state
regulatory agency (in most sta tes, a state engineer).  The
first was that water had to be put to a “beneficial” use,
generally  restricted to uses that required diversions from
the supply source.  The second prerequ isite for receiving
a right was that no existing appropriator would be harmed
if the prop osed righ t were granted.  Hence, prior-
appropriation law prote cted senio r (first-in-time ) rights
from more junior applicants.  Applying these criteria for
new appropriations by the regulator was a predictable,
technical, and hydrologic exercise where the agency had
little real discretion ary autho rity.  In receiving  reliable
rights, private owners could produce wealth by
construc ting econ omically  feasible pro jects.  
A major change occurre d early in  the 20th century.  Under
the authority  and impetus of the Reclamation Act of 1902,
the federal  government built large multi-purpose water
projects, and irrigation development in the region
benefitted from sig nificant sub sidies from  the nation’s
taxpayers.   But the state s never re linquished regulatory
control over the issuance of water rights.  In the case of
federal water pro jects, the federal government obtained
rights from the states, just as private irrigators did, and
federal water was then contracted to public districts and
individu al users.  
As the population and the economy of the region grew,
however,  urban, recreational, industrial, and conservation
demand for water increased.  Since water prices were
fixed by adm inistrative fiat,  this new demand could not be
satisfied without additional water, since existing water
supplies were ge nerally alre ady app ropriated .  Even with
the large fede ral dam s, pressures f or water r eallocation
among uses and geographic regions became intense as
large differences emerged in the use-value of water.  Of
particular importance were new instream demands for
water that often were frustrated because the existing water
allocation doctrines were designed to include only uses
that required diversion.  The upshot of the changing
econo mic environment was that if wealth from water use
was to be maximized, some way had to b e found  to
accom moda te water tran sfers to uses o f higher v alue.   
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I would argue, however,  that so long as the state agencies
confined their regulatory purview  of the allocation proc ess
to an appraisal of whether unappropriated water was
available  and made sure that other rights were not
damaged, the prior-appropriation doctrine was reasonably
effective in accommodating many water exchanges
among uses.  The exception was instream use.  Many of
the growing municipalities of the west bought
appropriation rights from irrigators to th e mutu al benefit
of both, although if these exchanges could be called
markets,  they were primitive at best.  The state regulatory
bodies had to approve any proposed changes in the place
and quantity o f use.  Bu t it was not the role of the
regulatory authority to judge the economic feasibility or
social desirability of the proposed  transfer.  These
judgem ents were left to the existing owners of rights and
those who wished to obtain them, both parties possessing
the incen tives to ma ke these v aluations. 
Two institutional innovations arose to accommodate the
changing demands for water.  The first was the gradual
emergence of more sophisticated markets where water
could  be moved to higher-v alued use s, subject to state
approv al, of course.  But water markets have always been
viewed suspiciously in many quarters of society that
argued that the assessments of private parties participating
in market decisions w ould no t give ade quate atten tion to
“public” or “comm unity” inte rests that were left out of the
private  marke t calcula tions.  This omission led to the
second innovation: legislative and judicial measures that
would  ostensibly regulate water allocations in the “public”
interest.   Even the state regulatory agencies have departed
from their traditional role of facilitating water transfers
and have assumed a position of a social arbiter where the
principal goal  has become to prom ote the pu blic interest.
If econom ic efficiency  and we alth maximization are to be
achieved in water allocation, I regard the development of
water markets as a strongly positive step, while water
allocation by politica l and judic ial agencies using a
public-trust criterion is a huge step backwards.  Let me
attempt to defend this position.
THE EMERGENCE OF WATER MARKETS
When I began to study water econom ics in the early
1960s,  water mark ets that permitted free exchanges
among willing buyers and sellers were very rare and were
considered by many to be dangerous and antisocial.  Why
was this so, given the commonly accepted view that
competitive markets efficiently co nvey resou rces to
higher-valued uses?  At least part of the answer is that
water has been dee med differen t from other reso urces,
such as land, that are traded in response to changing
valuations.   Wate r is a “social” resource, owned by the
people  collectively, a point that is explicit in the
constitutions of western  states.  Hence, the people, acting
collectively  through their political institutions, granted
usufructuary rights to  divert water and use it, but this was
different than owning the corpus of the water so that
marke t exchan ges cou ld be m ade. 
Because water was “differe nt,” complex  rules and
customs evolved that have been detrimental to the
development of markets that are now needed to reallocate
water.  These rules are embedded in federa l and state
agencies as well as in private and quasi-private water
agencies such as mutual irrigation companies and
irrigation an d conse rvancy  districts.  Some examples are
area-of-o rigin laws that are designed to protect water users
from political takings, statutory proh ibitions against
exporting water from one state to another, public-trust
reservations of instream uses, and pricing rules that were
embedded in federal reclamation law and copied by many
state water de velopm ent agen cies.  But p ublic choice
theory raises doubts as to whether these transfer
imped iments  really arose in response to “legitimate”
public  concerns or were merely the rent-seeking efforts of
entrenched special interests who wished to protect th eir
wealth  positions.  Although my predilection is to favor the
public  choice hypothesis, I do not believe that a definitive
answer to this question can be given without more
empirical research.
Further, many  obstacles to  free transfers of federal water
have been imposed by allocation and pricing rules
imposed by Congress to achieve income redistribution
(Gardner, 1996).  Especially important are the differential
repayments  to the federal government imposed on
different classes of water users, the hug e subsidy  given to
irrigators that has m ostly been  capitalized  into land
values, and the 160-acre limitatio n mean t to prom ote
family  farming on federal projects .  The first meant that
contracted water could not be transferred to M&I users
without the federal government imposing a higher water
charge, hence g reatly discouraging what would have been
econo mically  feasible transfers.  In the case of the 160-
acre limitation, potential transfers have been burdened
with a labyrinth of regulations that pertain to size of the
farm, whethe r irrigated lan d was o wned  or rented , and
what the values of raw and irrigated land were.  Howev er,
even with these obstacles, some transfers of federal water
have occurred, especially in recent years as regional
droug hts in the 1970s and 1990s have induced the federal
governm ent to relax transfer imp ediments.
Two legislative statutes at the federal level have been
particularly important in changing the institutional
environ ment:   The Reclamation Reform Act of 1984 and
the Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992
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(CVPIA).   The former relaxed some of the rigidities of
the 160-acre  limitation p olicy, and  the latter exp licitly
recognized water transfers and instream uses as
“beneficial” (Gardner and Warner).  The CVPIA was
watershed legislation in promoting water markets and
water-use  efficiency .  All individ uals or public  and priv ate
districts who receive Central Valley Project (CVP) water
under service or r epaym ent contracts are auth orized to
transfer all or a portion of the water to any other
Californ ia water use recognized as beneficial under
applicab le state law.  Howitt (1994) has argued that the
CVPIA  itself reflects the policy influence of a recent
coalition of urban and environmental interests, and a shift
in California voter preferences away from agricultural
development and cheap food towards urban water supplies
and environmental quality.  By allowing farmers to sell up
to 20 percent of their water without approval of their local
water district or agency, the CVPIA has, for the first time,
vested the prop erty right to the first 20 percent of contract
water directly in the individua l user.  These conditions
contrast sharply w ith the incentives facing potential water
sellers in the Bureau of Reclamation (BR ) districts before
the passage of CVPIA.
How itt reports da ta that are rev ealing.  T he absence of
incentives for sales by individual users first came to the
fore in California’s 1976-77 drought.  The Bureau of
Reclamation established an emergency water bank that
purchased water fro m con tractors and  sold it to other
users.  Given the federal restrictions on pricing in 1977,
however,  the BR could offer only a small  incentive price
above the nom inal water c ost.  Hence, purchases of water
through the bank averaged $39.60 per acre-foot with some
as low as $1 5.  The 1 977 ba nk attracted  sales of on ly
38,000 acre-feet of water from farming.  This contrasts
sharply  with drought sales under the 1991 water bank run
by the Calif ornia State Departm ent of Water R esources,
which offered the se llers of wate r $125 p er acre-fo ot.
Even though the 1990s drought was similar in sev erity to
the one in the 1970s, 820,000 acre-feet of water we re
offered in the two and half months before  the department
stopped purchases, and the quantity supplied exceeded the
quantity demanded by two to one.
There can be little doubt that barriers to water markets are
quickly  crumbling in nearly all western states, and the
frequency and m agnitud e of ma rket transfe rs will increase
sharply  in the years ahead, contributing imp ortantly to
more efficient water allocation and the creation of wealth.
Terry Anderson and Pamela Snyder (1997) have
chronicled many of these ma rkets developing throughout
the region.  Even though  a water b ank in  Idaho has existed
since 1928 and the Utah market referred to in the opening
paragraph has been operating since the 1930s, the pace of
new markets has been accelerating in the last decade.  But
we should  not be too sanguine that all is well beca use it is
also evident th at poli tical allocation s are also likely  to
increase under th e banne r of pub lic trust, and th ese will
not be g enerally fa vorable  to wealth c reation. 
RENT-SEEKING AND STATE WATER
REGULATION
The case for g overnm ent regula tion of reso urce use in
general as a  “public trust” has been stated by Sax (1984:
p.131) as follow s:
The regulators believe that individual behavior in the
market reveals only one species of preference and
therefore is incomplete.  There is, they [the regulators]
say, a kind of  preferen ce that peo ple hold so lely in
their capacity as members of collectivities, and for
which only co llectivities speak .  One such collectivity
is the political community or the government.  When
the governm ent regulates or con trols use as own er, it
is expressing a collective preference.
Exercise  of the pu blic-trust d octrine allows the political
comm unity  to trump the exercise of priv ate prope rty
rights (Dana).  Historically, howeve r, the public trust in its
purest form was used only to regulate commerce,
navigation, and fishing on navigable water bodies.  It was
developed under the common law of England, but has
been utilized for more than 200 years in the United States
as well (Washburn).  Generally it is activated through
judicial action, but not always.   And because there are no
constitutional or statutory  guideline s for the jud iciary to
follow, courts in  the United  States hav e had co nsiderab le
latitude in defining and  interpreting public trust righ ts.
Washburn  (1987) has noted some significant issues that
have emerg ed.  Frequ ently, more than on e public tru sts
are simultan eously in voked  in a specific situation, and no
definitive standards exist to help courts or legislators
prioritize these rights.  In addition, determination of
whethe r a public  trust right in w ater even  exists is highly
subjective and controversial because of conflicting
interests  in water u se.  And f inally, the rela tionship
between traditional private-property rights and expanding
public-trust rights is not clear, and because of this
ambig uity it has been relatively easy to “tak e” private
rights.  But with  private righ ts in such jeo pardy, t he
uncertain ty created could be a major deterrent to
management and investment planning requisite to
economic efficiency.
The Mono  Lake case  from California is a perspicuous
exam ple of invocation of the public  trust doctrine.  More
than forty years ago, the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Po wer acq uired land  and wa ter rights in the
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Mono Basin, and according to appropriation law received
permits  from the California Department of Water
Resources to appropriate water from the tributaries of
Mono Lake.  As a result of these  lawful diversions, water
levels in the lake dropped, increasing salinity and
reducing shrimp populations, and one of the lake’s islands
became a peninsula, exposing many gull nests to land
predators (Dana) .  Several e nvironmental organizations
joined in a suit to limit water diversions f rom the basin.
The core of the plaintiffs’ argument was that the State of
California holds the environmental endowment of Mono
Lake in a trust capacity for California citizens that can be
neither ceded nor neglected by the California Department
of Water Resources.  The California Supreme Court ruled
that the public-trust doctrine protects navigable waters
from harm cause d by diversion of nonna vigable
tributaries; and that the pub lic trust doctrin e protects
navigation, commerce, fishing, open space, scenic and
wildlife preservation, and the changing public needs of
ecological preservation (Rossmann).
Another example showing ex panding p ublic trust
initiatives occurred in a case decided by the Montana
Supreme Court in 1984.  Both the Dearborn and
Beaverhead Rivers w ere foun d to be federally navigable;
therefore, it was argued that a clear p ublic right to use  the
streams existed.  If the waters are owned by the State and
held in trust for the people by the S tate, no priv ate party
may bar the use of those waters by the people.  It was
ruled that the Mon tana Const itution and the p ublic-trust
doctrine do not permit a  private party to interfere with the
public’s right to recreational use of the surface of the
State’s wa ters (Mo ntana C oalition . . . vs. C urran). 
Many other examples could be cited.  It is safe to say that
in almost every western state, the water-right regulatory
authority  is now expanding its view of water a llocation to
include a public trust dime nsion.  Th e effects on  private
property  rights and on economic efficiency are
incalculab le but must be large.  This is because
navigation, fishing, water supply, mineral extraction,
wildlife preservation, and recreation have all been
recognized in public  trust litigation.  However, mo netary
valuations of many of th ese uses are  murk y at best.
Where  the resou rce itself is unp riced, its relative  scarcity
and the value of alternative uses seem unlikely to find
reflection in the decisions taken by legislatures and the
courts.  Therefore, whether the conflic t is joined in a
legislative or judicial  forum, the decisio n essentially  will
be political in nature.  And, if political, public choice
theory tel ls  us much about the eventual outcome.  The
configuration of competing uses in terms of numbers and
concentration of interests will affect the eventual
allocations.  If the beneficiaries of one use are few and
concentrated while those from another are mo re
numero us, unorganized, and dispersed, then  the first will
almost  always dominate the political bargaining that
occurs (Gardner 1995, C hapters 7-9).
Hence, in the final analysis, the conflict between the
public  trust doctrine and the existing system of
appropriative water rights revolves around the question of
how long any western state can co ntinue to wear tw o hats:
one as a public  trustee and the other as an administrator of
maximum beneficial use  (Dana).  This conflict is not
trivial, and the rate of economic growth will be
substantially  affected b y how  it is resolved.  I t is my view
that market exchanges offer the greatest opportunities for
increasing econom ic efficiency  in water all ocation.
Mark ets should b e actively p romo ted at all levels a nd in
all branches of government, and in the quasi-private water
and irrigation d istricts where  transfer im pedim ents
continue to restrict water movement to higher-valued uses.
Within -year trades and  annual re ntals, whe re the basic
long-term property rights remain unchanged, should be
encouraged, as should  the permanent transfer of the water
right itself, subject only to state approval that takes into
account protecting  the wealt h positions of other water
appropriators.
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